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India accounts for one of the world’s largest unbanked populations, yet political intermediation remains an overlooked channel through which households access formal finance. Using IHDS II (2011–12) data, we distinguish between direct and indirect political ties and how patronage correlates with financial inclusion. Theoretically, we extend the political rent-extraction and governance literatures to the household credit margin by showing how political intermediation operates over the intensity and enforcement of private credit contracts. Unlike firm-level studies, we shift the lens to households and argue that in competitive democracies, political ties operate less through access and more through allocation and enforcement discretion. The findings reveal that political ties do not raise the likelihood of basic account access; indirect ties are associated with 18–22% larger formal loans even after onboarding selection and endogeneity concerns, which at the sample mean (INR 48,900) corresponds to roughly INR 9,000–10000 (≈USD 160–190, based on average exchange rates in 2011–12) in additional borrowing per politically connected household. The regulatory concern is therefore monitoring contract terms and repayment discipline among politically mediated borrowers. These results offer fresh evidence on the political rent-extraction literature, with implications for financial governance and scrutiny of politically exposed borrower networks.
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Saibal Ghosh (2026) studied this question.
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