Artistic Value Defended

In recent writing within the philosophy of art, it has become common to distinguish artistic and aesthetic value. There are multiple motivations for making this distinction, some of which are indicated below, but a common thread is a rejection of the aesthetic conception of art. That conception received its most refined expression in the writings of Monroe Beardsley.1 There, art is defined in terms of an intention to create an object that provides aesthetically valuable experience; understanding artworks consists in apprehending their aesthetic properties, and most important for the purpose of this article, the value of an artwork is identical to the value of the aesthetic experience it has the capacity to deliver. Each of these claims has been criticized by subsequent philosophers of art, but it is the criticism of the last claim that is pertinent here. There are two main thoughts behind this criticism: first, that there are valuable artworks that lack aesthetic value, and, second, that even among artworks that have aesthetic value, their value as art is not exhausted by their aesthetic value. Both thoughts suggest that we should distinguish between aesthetic and artistic value. However, the distinction has never received universal acceptance. There have been a number of recent attempts to reinvigorate an aesthetic conception of art and artistic value.2 In addition, Dominic McIver Lopes has recently argued that there is no coherent notion of nonaesthetic artistic value that is not trivial, that can distinguish between what makes works valuable as art and the adventitious values those works also possess.3 The main purpose of this article is to present arguments for the existence of artistic value and to provide a viable, nontrivial conception of such value. Since Lopes offers the most direct arguments against artistic value, I evaluate these and show that my proposals evade them. Finally, I challenge the one positive proposal Lopes makes in his article. For the sake of concision, henceforth, when I speak of artistic value, I mean a type of value not identical with, but that may include, aesthetic value. Artistic value, as I conceive it, derives from a set of values relevant to evaluating artworks as art. Aesthetic value no doubt is a member of this set, but not the only member. I take it that it is the existence of this type of value that is challenged by Lopes. Why has it become widely held that there is such a thing as artistic value? As just noted, there are two main reasons. The first and simplest derives from the appearance of anti‐aesthetic art (originally simply called “anti‐art”), beginning with Dada, developing further in conceptual art, performance art, and other avant‐garde movements. These works were originally made to challenge a variety of assumptions about art, and were later made to redirect the focus of art from matters aesthetic to ideas of various kinds. It would be oversimplistic to claim that no works made within these movements have aesthetic value, but the thought is either that some of these works completely lack aesthetic interest yet are valuable as art or, more modestly, that some of these works have such modest aesthetic interest that their aesthetic value cannot account for their value as art. Something else must be involved. Consider, for example, Sherri Levine's photographs of Walker Evans's photographs. In a way, they do have aesthetic value since they inherit the aesthetic value of the object photographed. But that can hardly explain their value as art. I have argued elsewhere that the value of the photographs is primarily cognitive. They refocus our attention not only on properties, including aesthetic properties, but also on social and art‐historical ones that their subjects have as photographs.4 Levine's photographs also have art‐historical value in marking an important stage in the development of appropriated art, which also contributes to its value as art. From the premises that some artworks lack aesthetic value or lack sufficient aesthetic value to explain their value as art and that they have significant value as art, it follows that there is nonaesthetic artistic value. The second argument does not appeal to avant‐garde works specifically. It derives from a strong sense that many people—philosophers, artists, and critics—came to have that traditional aesthetic theory of the kind that was magisterially expressed in Beardsley's Aesthetics was inadequate to account for the value they found or intended to create in art. It does not do justice to the variety of ways in which we engage with artworks and with art's engagement with the world. Noël Carroll's “Art and Interaction” is an example of a fairly early article in this vein.5 In this piece, Carroll does not appeal to art's ability to teach us something about the actual world or the ethical properties of artworks that he wrote about in later essays. Rather, he focuses on other nonaesthetic properties of artworks that we value in interacting with them as artworks. Carroll points out that people enjoy the challenge of finding hidden meanings, latent structures, and important connections with other artworks. So art is valued as an object of interpretation; it has art‐historical value as well as cognitive value and ethical value. Further, that valuing artworks in these ways is an unremarkable way of responding to them as art is evident in the practice of critics and audiences. The aesthetic value of works does not wholly account for these responses. Artworks must have value as art that goes beyond their aesthetic value. Hence, there is nonaesthetic artistic value. The argument from indiscernibles is another argument for artistic value.6 It is the only one discussed by Lopes. It goes like this: If the value of a work of art is wholly aesthetic, then its value supervenes on its perceptual features. If the value supervenes on its perceptual features, then no work differs in value from an indiscernible twin. Some works differ in value from perceptually indiscernible twins. So the value of a work of art is not wholly aesthetic. So works of art bear artistic value distinct from aesthetic value.7 So stated, it is a more problematic argument, I think, than the two mentioned above. As Lopes notes, 1 can be questioned. In fact, 1 is not plausible across the arts. Apart from any other problems it might have, it is false for literature and any other arts not accessed primarily through perception. Also, the expression ‘perceptual features’ is ambiguous, as has been pointed out by Peter Lamarque.8 It can mean a feature accessible to the senses with no background knowledge. Or it can mean any feature we can discern from perception no matter how much background information is required before we can do so. Two objects may be perceptually indiscernible in virtue of having the same perceptual features in the first sense, but may be perceptually discernible in virtue of their perceptual features in the second sense. Lamarque would argue that a restricted version of premise 1 (confined to perceptual artworks) might be true if ‘perceptual features’ is meant in the second sense, but a similarly restricted version of premise 3 would be true only if the first sense of ‘perceptual features’ is intended. Hence, the argument might commit the fallacy of equivocation. The bulk of Lopes's discussion focuses on the inference from 4 to 5. But I believe that misstates the real issue with which he is concerned, which is the reference of the expression ‘the value of a work of art.’ The expression occurs in 1 and 2 as well as 4. It is clearly meant to refer to the value of a work as art, or when evaluated as art. It is clearly not meant to refer to just any value an artwork might have for whatever reason. Lopes's discussion challenges whether there really is a referent to the expression meant as intended and whether we can specify what the referent is. The two earlier arguments are superior to the argument from indiscernibles. They are unquestionably valid and their premises are much harder to question than those of the argument from indiscernibles. One could try to argue that aesthetic value wholly accounts for the value of avant‐garde works mentioned in the first argument when evaluated as art, or alternatively, that they have little or no value when so evaluated. One could also try to argue that the types of value mentioned in the second argument really are not relevant to the evaluation of artworks as art, or that they can ultimately be understood as a species of aesthetic value. All of these positions have been argued, but, as I have argued elsewhere, with little success.9 The first two arguments also better capture the motivation for an appeal to artistic value. What they do not do is give us a general principle for distinguishing artistic value from just any value artworks happen to possess. But should we consider that a flaw in these arguments? Certainly not. The premises of these arguments do not purport to define artistic value. What they purport to do is to show that in evaluating works as art, we do not—in fact, cannot—confine ourselves to aesthetic value. That makes a strong prima facie case for the existence of nonaesthetic artistic value. We can say something stronger. They entail that if there is artistic value at all, there is nonaesthetic artistic value. Lopes, in arguing that we cannot specify the referent of the expression ‘(nonaesthetic) artistic value’ in a nontrivial way, is assuming that such a failure decisively undermines all three arguments. I would claim that is not so. If specifying requires defining artistic value (rather than, say, pointing to some examples of it), it might well be the case we cannot do that. The possibility of giving definitions of crucial has been questioned. to give a way to distinguish nonaesthetic artistic value from value of we may have strong of the existence of the is strong if we can show that there is no such thing as artistic value at all, the would be for as we no in the that. However, I there is a way to specify artistic value. So I to how it can be The challenge is to a way to distinguish nonaesthetic properties that to artistic value from those that works valuable in some way or other but to artistic value. such a distinction, it might be if the arguments nonaesthetic of artistic value with simply finding ways we happen to value artworks. is that it was just argued at the of the that having a to believe that there is nonaesthetic artistic value does not a of such it would be to have a understanding of the of artistic value and the way that valuable is to valuable as a and so does one distinguish artistic value from values that artworks happen to As be below, on my artistic value derives from what to do in their works as by of the art and to which the works is a I have elsewhere that this: does one to the work to its valuable in that If it is an artistic value. If it is this I to say something about the of understanding I have in and how it is from other that can be meant by derives primarily from artworks and, in on my them for work is a matter of what an does in a not as of to do just However, I do not to the relevant sense of understanding to one about There are about work as well as about that reference to work For example, there are that the of of a the of relevant to understanding a there are many other that could be meant by understanding that are by this For example, for any a work there is some of it has that and the us to it has the But to define an in this way would not us to distinguish a of properties for artistic value since it all properties artworks the sense of understanding I have indicated is to the of artworks and, a plausible to their value in art. us how the works in If an artwork has cognitive or ethical value that is of its artistic value, one to the work to this value. That it is not to that a work has an matter to a about its artistic value. One has to what of of its matter it what this it what it requires its to and to before one can this value. That is what an understanding of a work However, such understanding is not required to adventitious valuable properties of artworks. is for the ability of a to a in the But it is also true of value from more social such as the value of a do one primarily to the have at or other One can by for an of some works are more valuable than at a this may of some artistic such as the of the work or the artistic it is with, or even the critics consider it to But this well of the understanding that and, in any the between value and such is on the for works with such and the value those which that no matter how well we a work that never be sufficient to value. There are some other that might be thought to challenge this I consider three here. one may if one to works to their art‐historical that features such as a its the of a its value is an artistic value, but if we to say this is it is to distinguish ways a work can be that do not art‐historical value. For example, a might be the first to that the value of within The then is valuable as for the but is not However, when we works as we do not mean that they have something about but that they some valuable to the work that was not found in earlier such as ability to the of on and valuable and also of what we consider like The by and by They were intended to and such as those in the and in in to those in them an artistic value? The that they are to such is not an artistic value, any more than the that The of by a of is a in that But the that it is a defining feature of this type of artwork to be in this way, when it in virtue of its properties such as then this is an artistic virtue that requires an understanding of the work to Finally, consider the value of a for a of the of the has this value is simply that it was first on a significant and the has been to the this kind of requires no understanding of the However, it may be that this than also on that to have value it expressed a to the In that understanding the is for understanding it has value for the But value is as However, it is not that this example a to the One can say that the value that the properties has two One is the value of the as a for the expression of The second is the of that expression of for a that is on the on which the was The first an artistic value the would have even its having value. The second does not an artistic value. So we could say that value on could a of one one So much for the it sufficient to the existence of artistic value? Lopes might object that I have simply the notion of value in art, which he as a conception of artistic value. I to some of his arguments intended to such a For his account of value in art, Lopes a by is a value in art is in a work to the that the work the for which it was made or this is a value in a work if and only if is a purpose for which the work was made or If this is then the proposal I have is not to value in art as so are made for all of to what the does in the or to to an art or For example, they might be made for the purpose of finding or is if not true for the people have in But the of such values does not understanding the So my proposal them out as artistic However, Lopes that he could have been Since he to some of one can that not all the value in art with such a In fact, some it with a than my I that there is a that Lopes might my for artistic value as simply value in art. whether he I not But the actual of proposals that might as value in art, do all of these the notion of value as That is from What we have been are values we in art when we evaluate them as art. The two arguments us to that when we evaluate works as art, we are not just evaluating them for aesthetic value some works we value as art lack significant aesthetic value and many works that do have significant aesthetic value are valued as art for other properties they possess. So as as we can adventitious what is the Why should the value as Lopes that it the notion of artistic value it makes many values artistic of the artistic value by the theory aesthetic value, value, value, value, value, value, and One can about some of these The important thing to is that just a work say, does not mean that this is an artistic value. value could be an artistic value of some but is not sufficient to it so. I have a for when it but is there something more that can be that and this an aesthetic theory of art believe that artistic value derives from art's aesthetic one version of such a artworks are objects intended for aesthetic and artistic value is the value we from the work when understood and so would be aesthetic value. not that this is Lopes's to an The aesthetic theory is the and the most plausible of an conception of artistic conception that derives from the of art. But the aesthetic theory of art has been for some and some mentioned to it, it a The is that what art is not provide of artistic value. that we a account of artistic Artistic value derives from what to do in their works as by of the art and to which the works But even those and what them are we should a conception of artistic value, it is not that a number of values are of artistic and that what is an artistic value not be across all artworks. They artistic values the work with such a value is of the in making the and the value requires understanding the Lopes has two in his of artistic value. The first is the which I have to in the The second is the art that there are no artistic only or Hence, we cannot a notion of artistic value a conception of artistic Also, artworks are never the but more art or art Hence, we cannot a notion of artistic value a notion of artwork as an that we do not objects as artworks and do not artistic in understanding If this is it would the arguments and the for artistic value above. However, as and as these arguments they are for two reasons. a in an artwork in fact, the of art. is true with avant‐garde we first like we to not they are or even what value they have as but they are art and what value they have as art. is when first they were a and, in our with to it is to how they could be of artistic value or how they could be to other we as art. they have aesthetic value claims to the they of a kind of cognitive value that artworks of various are at such as making us the of However, an artwork not to a for it to about its artistic value. we photographs of photographs in an we do not these are but we might they are art and what value they might have as art. value might not be It may or may not be to but it to be something we can to be an artistic value. So we can objects as artworks and we can artistic the that we primarily value objects as or as not objects as art, is not or is at is there are as art and not as art, and we value these in There are of art, and so on that are other but are not of the art is not just true for there is an art there is a it a of the are valued in ways on whether they also to the relevant art or not. However, all of a can be evaluated So there must be other artistic values that explain the ways we value of a I believe art‐historical which are not to any one art are significant here. The important is that in valuing something as a member of an art it as art is just as important as it as a It is the that us to value it In addition, if we of we are not evaluating them as in a We do not just the art from we or we for that the cannot be as as the Finally, Lopes whether we value as art as to valuing them as and so his is has value as art and yet there is such a thing as artistic value as aesthetic One can and only by at one of Lopes might has value simply as art. If this is what he does that would do the there is artistic value. We could with this the arguments and the for artistic value. In the all that there is artistic value, even if valuable as art derives from valuable as something such as a or a and so is further by Lopes's one positive to which I Lopes's positive proposal is an artistic value is an aesthetic value of an artwork as a is art or other art for this if there are artworks that do not to an art kind but artistic value. like or Some of these can be so or that we them as artworks. But are like within which there is an art I doubt this is so in some such as of is an artwork of its aesthetic value, yet it aesthetic value of an artwork as a there is no art kind to which it So it is an artwork of its aesthetic value, but, to Lopes's positive it does not have artistic value it aesthetic value as a That is might a we not a of art, that the of all of that are But that the question whether the of simply have aesthetic value or whether they have something not just aesthetic value or even aesthetic value as but aesthetic value as art. That they have the last kind of value is I believe the of aesthetic value as an art kind a more of aesthetic value as with artistic value. Artistic value a set of values it is any value relevant to the evaluation of artworks as art, or, in other it is any value that we from works within art or when as of those or if we are something as to the art we are it as would be value or value. But aesthetic value is it is not from any or It is It has to be defined in its like value or cognitive value. Aesthetic value can be in ways in but it cannot be a value in So the real with the proposal is that there is no such thing as aesthetic value as a value as a a even if there are of that have aesthetic value. the of his article, Lopes makes a of that of artistic value. value not it There are many values in art, which can and do to the understanding of the value of One would like to more aesthetic value not it in artworks as a understanding of the value of art what we to evaluate artworks as If the to these is then I Lopes the existence of artistic value, for these would its But if the are then the of this is to is not whether cognitive and value in artworks are artistic values but whether they in significant ways with aesthetic occurs is an important as Lopes it, one kind of value or values are present in an it is that one is to the artistic value of the it might be the work has value, and this that it has an aesthetic value that makes it a better but the value is to its a better is It is just two values are so in an it is relevant to the in making the work and, if the is and values would be relevant to the value as art. some I Lopes that the only conception of nonaesthetic artistic value would be a We about We also that some of these nonaesthetic values in significant ways with aesthetic value in some artworks. this those works cannot be understood or evaluated this We on this We about whether some notion of aesthetic value can be in a conception of artistic value. I have argued that it Lopes that it We also on whether there is a account of nonaesthetic artistic value that it from value in art. I have argued that there Lopes there is not. If I have been two have been there are arguments that show that there is artistic value distinct from aesthetic value, and, second, we have a way of the Artistic value is value that can only be by understanding the works that