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We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of “distance sales contracts”. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is static and, unlike with only ex ante participation constraints, does not elicit the agent's information sequentially. This holds whenever differences in ex ante and ex post outside options are below a positive upper bound. Welfare effects of mandatory withdrawal rights are ambiguous. Since it is insufficient in our setting to consider only local incentive constraints, we develop a novel technique to identify the relevant global constraints.
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Krähmer et al. (2015) studied this question.
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