从对抗门阀到地域权力分封——科举制的兴衰

English Abstract: The imperial examination system (keju) is one of the key institutions for understanding the evolution of Chinese imperial governance. This paper employs the "Productive Political Philosophy" framework to systematically trace the complete lifecycle of the keju system from its birth to its abolition. It argues that the keju originated as an institutional weapon against aristocratic clans and a tool for deepening the prefectural-county system, serving as a key pillar for the dominance of the "Confucian skin and Legalist bones" hybrid. However, under the geographical and climatic conditions of a vast territory with diverse populations, the keju gradually turned into its own opposite—a nominally fair examination system that evolved into a substantively extreme form of regional power enfeoffment. Through its screening of "moral essays," it fundamentally reshaped the capability model of political elites, systematically excluding practical-achievement-oriented talents. Regions with superior living conditions monopolized imperial political power through the keju, while regions bearing the greatest survival pressures lacked political representation. When the empire faced existential crises, the regional interest groups in power obstructed cross-regional resource allocation, turning the keju into an institutional driver of imperial collapse. Zhu Yuanzhang attempted to break this pattern but collided with the iron wall of "kernel inheritability." The failure of the Single Whip Law and Zhang Juzheng's cognitive limitations serve as typical cases of this institutional defect. The keju was ultimately replaced by a modern education system better suited to the fundamental function of "ensuring the survival of the community." The paper argues that the keju's birth was to counter aristocratic clans, and its demise came because it itself became a new kind of clan—not one of blood, but of region.