Investor Relations Management and Excessive Executive Perks: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Effectively curbing excessive executive perks in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is an important part of deepening SOE reform and an inherent requirement for achieving high-quality economic development. Based on a sample of Shenzhen A-share state-controlled listed companies from 2014 to 2020, this study examines how investor relations management (IRM) affects excessive executive perks in SOEs. The empirical results show that IRM significantly reduces excessive executive perks. Mechanism analysis reveals that this effect operates through two channels: (i) enhanced board monitoring and (ii) increased monitoring by analysts and the media. Furthermore, heterogeneity analysis indicates that IRM has a stronger restraining effect on excessive executive perks in competitive SOEs and in SOEs not affected by government audits. While based on the Chinese context, this study contributes to the broader literature on the determinants of excessive executive perks and the value effects of IRM, offering significant implications for improving corporate governance, addressing executive corruption, and advancing SOE reform in emerging markets.