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Policy analysis uncovers structural barriers to financial intelligence sharing in African economies, suggesting trust and power dynamics dictate regulatory success.
Following Nigeria’s greylisting in 2023 and Kenya’s in 2024; the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) role has never been more pertinent. Both countries were greylisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) due to recorded deficiencies in their Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) frameworks. A deficiency noted across both countries was the dearth of inter-agency collaboration, which their FIUs, tasked with addressing systemic AML/CFT vulnerabilities, have been charged with resolving. Inter-agency collaboration is the fulcrum of FIUs operationalisation as the agency works with multiple regulatory and enforcement bodies to foster intelligence and information sharing while facilitating joint and cross-country investigations. While various scholars have considered FIUs' agenda from a practical perspective, very limited literature has explored the theoretical underpinnings that frame and rationalise how these agencies function. We argue that viewing FIUs through the theoretical lens of the political work of trust, bureaucratic entanglements, and unequal power structures reframes how inter-agency collaboration can be harnessed contextually to realise their success.
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Malala et al. (2026) studied this question.
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