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The target of Peter Carruthers’s excellent new book is what he terms the ‘Standard Model’ in philosophy of action, according to which most human action is intentional (that is, reasons-responsive, driven by what a subject believes, desires, and intends). Yet most human action, Carruthers contends, is not like this. The underlying problem he diagnoses is that the Standard Model is the result of armchair philosophical theorizing about action and the mind, and once the model is exposed to the relevant empirical evidence, from psychology and neuroscience, Carruthers thinks we will see that much of it is mistaken. There is a great deal to like in the nuanced application of empirical findings to the philosophy of action and the detailed argumentation which Carruthers provides but, to put my cards on the table from the start, I wasn’t absolutely convinced by the book’s overall framing as a take-down of the Standard Model. My view here is probably due in no small part to the fact that I’ve recently defended a version of the Standard Model myself, so I’m certainly far from an impartial reviewer. However, after providing a chapter outline, I’ll try and just sketch the places where I think an advocate of a Standard Model might push back. To be clear, though, none of what I’ll have to say should detract from the take-home message: this is an important book which should certainly be read by anyone interested in understanding human action and what empirical evidence can tell us about it.
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Emma Borg (2026) studied this question.
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