The Possibility of Incomparability

How do the colour blue and the number four relate with respect to their tastiness? Most disregard these cases of ‘non-comparability’ due to the fact that they seem to be of no interest when discussing practical reasoning. They are taken to be nonsensical and consequently do not cause a problem for everyday practical deliberation. In this paper, non-comparability is treated more carefully and not swiftly judged to be of no philosophical interest. It is argued that non-comparability constitutes support for the claim that there can be instantiated incomparability. First, several definitions of non-comparability are presented. Then a toy example is presented to show how non-comparability can cause a problem for practical deliberation. Finally, well-known discussions involving irreducible normative concepts are shown to constitute cases of non-comparability that are interesting from the perspective of practical reasoning. It is concluded that non-comparability provides substantial support for the possibility of instantiated incomparability.