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At the present time philosophers of history, in their treatment of historians' claims as to the occurrence of events in the past, may be divided into two schools: empiricists and instrumentalists/constructionists.I The realist empiricist sees the historian as first collecting his evidence and then building his account of the past on the basis of this sound foundation. Such an approach is open to a form of skepticism where it is claimed that nothing can serve as evidence about past events because they are unobservable and can be regarded as evidence for P if and only if E and P have sometimes been found together.'2 It is partly in response to this skepticism that the instrumentalist/constructionist position has been developed. According to this view the historian takes objects in the present and constructs an account of the past in order to explain the presence of these objects. Such an approach is vulnerable: historiographical instrumentalism asserts both that there is no real past and that its constructions of that past account for or explain present evidence . . . only a construction that is offered as representing a real past can have force in accounting for the present evidence that is held to survive from the past..3 More important, however, is the fact that realist empiricism and instrumentalism/constructionism share a common fallacy: both subscribe to the myth of evidence. For both, the description of a present object (the evidence) is given. It will be the argument of the present essay that the historian's description of his data (presently perceptible objects) is never independent of his narratives of events in the past, such that all data descriptions are narrative-laden.
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B. C. Hurst (1981) studied this question.
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