Relationships with opponent and partner in mixed-motive bargaining

With the exception of a few recent studies (Hermann and Kogan, 1968; Thibaut and Gruder, 1969), research on mixed-motive bargaining has neglected intergroup negotiations in favor of focus on interpersonal negotiations. Negotiations in the real world, however, often involve a spokesman who bargains on behalf of a constituency against an adversary who is also a group representative. In order to understand the process of resolving conflict between groups, it is necessary to investigate the iIndependent and joint effects of each negotiator's relationship with his constituency and with his adversary. To this end, the present experiment varied independently a negotiator's accountability to his partner and to his opponent to determine the effects on his bargaining of the extent to which he felt answerable to each of these parties. Accountability to partner and to opponent were manipulated independently but in an analogous