Deterrence by Default? Israel's Military Strategy in the 2006 War against Hizballah

This article explores the question: What was Israel's military strategy when it went to war against Hizballah and Lebanon in 2006? It argues that Israel's decision to go to war was not based on a thorough in-depth analysis of the specific situation at hand, but rather rooted in its strategic outlook cultivated in the decades preceding the war. This thinking has largely focused on the concept of deterrence, and should deterrence fail, to restore deterrence and ensure that the opponent would refrain from similar actions in the future. The need to have a clear political component – which the military effort should support – appears to have been significantly less in focus. Thus an almost pre-destined recipe of responding militarily ‘dramatically beyond the expectations of the enemy’ was put in action from the outset. The perception that a more specifically tailored military strategy was not needed was a miscalculation.