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he notion of political manipulation of the economy-elected officials implementing policies to enhance their chances of reelection is widely accepted by scholars. And yet, empirical support is far from conclusive, which is astonishing given the extent to which we assume that politicians are driven by reelection goals.2 Why is the evidence not more compelling? This article argues that political models of the economy can be improved by a more refined specification of the variables. First, because incumbents have different perceptions of what macroeconomic manipulations serve their political interests, the independent variables should reflect a broader range of specific political goals. Three distinct political goals serve as independent variables: the Political Business Cycle, macroeconomic stabilization policy, and partisan or constituency benefits. Second, the dependent variable is measured as a narrow economic instrument-capital investment by nationalized firms-as opposed to broadly conceived macroeconomic outcomes. Finally, institutional factors are incorporated in the model on the assumption that they determine the likelihood and nature of political manipulation of the economy. Based on an analysis of capital investment by government-owned enterprises, I conclude that there is evidence of political manipulation of the economy by elected officials.
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Raymond Duch (1990) studied this question.
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