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Global communication flows increasingly face efforts to renationalize information control, most visibly through data localization rules requiring firms to store user data within national borders. While prior research often emphasizes regime type (i.e., autocratic incentives) to explain such policies, we argue that international factors also play a central role. Data flows are both channels of economic opportunity and sources of strategic vulnerability, as information systems can be exploited for surveillance and coercion by foreign adversaries. When states perceive a greater risk of coercion, they are more willing to bear the economic costs of closure and adopt stringent localization laws. We test this argument by comparing state behavior before and after the Snowden revelations, which exposed the American government’s capacity to weaponize the commercial Internet. Post-Snowden, states geopolitically distant from the United States were more likely to implement stricter localization rules. A case study of China shows how these revelations acted as a salience shock, prompting US rivals to prioritize security over economic considerations. Empirically, we present a novel dataset on national localization efforts; theoretically, we link our findings to debates on economic closure versus openness, highlighting how coercion can reshape global digital markets.
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Beaumier et al. (2026) studied this question.
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