Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments: Extended Queues versus Committee Expansion

Some committee assignments are perceived as being more valuable than others, requiring some systematic rationing device. Two institutions have evolved to serve this function: queuing and committee expansion. In order to discover which assignments are perceived as most valuable, a measure based on pairwise comparisons of transfers is suggested, with higher ranks associated with longer queues for membership. This measure, called a net transfer dominance ranking, is computed for the 80th-9lst and 95th-99th Congresses. Various explanations for the profound changes in the ranking between these two periods are offered. The most general explanation, and the most persuasive based on statistical evidence, is that increases in committee size reduce the value of a given seat by diluting its institutional power. Thus queuing and expansion are complementary and suggest an equilibrating process as the leadership strategy for satisfying excess demand for the most desirable committees.