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This paper examines the hybrid war (HW) between Russia and the West. The paper identifies three distinct stages of HW, including its emergence in the mid-2000s and two subsequent escalations, 2014–2021 and 2022–2025. HW differs from the Cold War (CW), unfolding under new conditions of a struggle for global order. Unlike realist and liberal theories, I focus not only on conflicting security interests and differences in political systems but also on the (non) recognition of identity and status. I argue that in HW, the primary focus is on undermining and changing the other side’s political system. The West, after the CW, has attempted to shape Russia’s system in the Western image, expecting recognition of the West as the dominant power. In Moscow’s eyes, this amounts to denying Russia the equal recognition it sought. Moscow has remained proudly defiant and, in time, began to influence and undermine the political system in the West, especially in Europe. The clash of non-recognition between the attitudes of hubris and pride has made domestic political stability of existential significance for leaders of both sides. For these reasons, in the absence of serious dialogue between the parties, HW may be protracted and even more dangerous than CW.
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Andreï P. Tsygankov (2026) studied this question.
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