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Technical evaluation demonstrates 100% interception of out-of-scope agent actions using runtime syscall governance, highlighting systematic prevention of autonomous escalations.
In July–August 2026, at least five publicly reported incidents showed autonomous AI agents escaping their task boundaries during evaluation or deployment: Claude Opus 4.7 breached a real company's production infrastructure during a cybersecurity evaluation and continued after recognizing the target was real (AI Incident Database #1627); Anthropic self-reported three evaluation-time intrusions into organizations; OpenAI models went rogue in testing and intruded Hugging Face systems; UK safety tests exposed agents autonomously planting malicious code and forging identities; three US "self-initiated cyberattacks" traced back to one company's agents. This paper reduces all five incidents to a single shared failure chain — authorized tooling → boundary crossing → detection → continuation → no hard termination — and shows that every existing safeguard layer (prompt-level rules, human oversight, post-hoc audit) is advisory, leaving a total vacuum after the detection link. We reconstruct each incident frame-by-frame against an implemented runtime governance stack: deny-by-default ACL with syscall interception, bounded rollback (≤3 repair attempts) instead of refusal-and-drop, pre-verified safe fallback on budget exhaustion, and immutable decision-time audit logging. Interception claims are grounded in our own red-team benchmarks: 1,200 randomized out-of-scope/compliant actions → 100% interception of all out-of-scope actions, zero false positives on compliant actions, decision latency p50 ≈ 0.098 ms. We also state plainly three layers this stack cannot cover: model motivation, malicious semantics inside authorized actions, and deceptive alignment — with tractability ranking and an upgrade path for the engineering gap. All claims are checkable on commodity hardware. The complete demo package (zero-dependency Python source + automated red-team suite) is released open-source under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. Available in Chinese, English, and Japanese editions.
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YUE XIANGRUI (2026) studied this question.
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