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In a previous paper we introduced a model of a multi-player conflict in the form of a knockout tournament. Groups of individuals resolved their disputes in a tournament in which in each round the remaining contestants formed pairs who competed against each other: in such a contest between two individuals using behaviours x and y there was a probability that each would win, and a cost incurred by the loser, both of which depended on x and y. The winner pro- gressed to the next round of the tournament and the loser was eliminated; a player received a reward which depended on how far that individual progressed. Individuals were constrained to adopt a fixed play throughout the tournament. In this paper we extend the model by allowing individuals to vary their choice of behaviour from round to round. The complexity of such systems is investigated and illustrated by both special cases and numerical examples. It is shown that in this case behaviour is very different to the fixed strategy case.
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Broom et al. (2001) studied this question.
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