The Normative Problem of Distrust in Epistemic Authorities

Hinge epistemology has recently entered the conversation of social epistemology by offering novel accounts of testimonial justification. If these accounts are to be taken seriously, then they should also be able to address cases of authoritative testimony and present novel benefits. In this article, I test whether social hinge epistemology can provide a framework to respond to the normative problem of laypeople’s distrust in epistemic authorities’ testimony. According to this framework, it is rationally required to assume certain basic presuppositions about an informant’s trustworthiness to obtain testimonial justification and participate in the testimonial practice. I apply the social hinge epistemology model to cases of rationally legitimate and illegitimate distrust, cases of lack of trust, and finally, cases of misplaced trust, thus providing a taxonomy of asymmetric relationships of trust. I then showcase the benefits of adopting this account of rationality to evaluate attitudes of distrust, as opposed to other theories available in the literature, such as pre-emptive-style accounts of epistemic authority’s testimony, as well as non-pre-emptive-style accounts.