The Evolution of Behavioral Strategies in Offshore Wind Governance: An Integrated Evolutionary Game and System Dynamics Approach

Expanding offshore wind energy introduces complex marine pollution liability challenges for specific emerging markets like Taiwan. Traditional static regulations often trigger administrative conflicts and struggle to adapt to dynamic stakeholder behaviors. This study develops an integrated socio-technical model combining evolutionary game theory (EGT) and system dynamics (SD) to analyze the strategic co-evolution between regulators and developers. The model is strictly calibrated using empirical data from Taiwan’s offshore wind sector to simulate various scenarios. Phase plane simulations reveal an “excess-liability paradox”. Crucially, the mathematical stability analysis identifies the intangible value of corporate reputation as the structural prerequisite for system convergence. Statutory penalties serve effectively as a complementary deterrent signal, but long-term stability requires normative shifts. We propose combining high statutory penalty deterrence with ESG-linked reputation mechanisms, providing a fundamental theoretical reference for emerging offshore wind markets facing similar initial regulatory and economic trade-offs.