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Prototype evaluation demonstrates low-latency policy enforcement in industrial IoT networks, indicating zero-trust security is feasible for non-hard-real-time operational technology.
Preprint notice. This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessible. Information technology/operational technology convergence in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments has expanded the attack surface and weakened perimeter-based security. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) is promising, but its adoption in operational technology is constrained by strict latency, continuous availability, legacy protocols, heterogeneous devices, and limited authentication or remote attestation. This study proposes ZT-IIoT, a Zero Trust reference architecture for IIoT, evaluated analytically and through a multi-protocol prototype. ZT-IIoT separates the control plane (identity, attestation, policy decision, risk) from the data plane, where gateway- and edge-level Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs) enforce local policies and microsegmentation, integrating device identity, continuous attestation with adaptive trust-token TTL, attribute-based access control with operational context, and a graduated response to risk. The analytical evaluation covers mapping to NIST SP 800-207, threat-model coverage, and comparison with common industrial security approaches, indicating that Zero Trust principles can be made compatible with non-hard-real-time OT traffic when authorization is enforced locally and safety-critical control loops are excluded. The Docker-based prototype implements a transparent native-wire protocol-aware PEP for Modbus/TCP that parses the function code from the wire and enforces policy on unmodified clients over a demonstrated non-bypassable path, alongside application-level mediation for MQTT and OPC UA with asymmetric (ES256) trust tokens. The isolated Zero-Trust overhead is 11.8–13.5ms on a cache hit and 15.7–17.8ms on a miss for the gateways, and 5.1/9.7ms for the native-wire Modbus PEP; throughput saturates near 100–140 requests/s; and control operations fail closed within ~425–435ms during PDP unavailability, while cached observations continue locally.
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Ioan Ungurean (2026) studied this question.
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