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In recent years, understanding of human embodiment and the theory of embodied cognition have been successfully applied to theology and religious studies. However, very little attention has been given to their application to mystical experience. The current study uses Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to engage with a sample of five contemporary first-hand accounts of mystical experience held in the Alister Hardy Religious Experience Research Centre database. The analysis yielded eleven Personal Experiential Themes divided into three Group Experiential Themes that relate to the embodied reality of mystical experience: ‘bodily sensations’; ‘sensory language’; and ‘mind–body dualism’. These themes are brought into critical engagement with the theory of embodied cognition to ascertain whether the theory has any explanatory value. Based on the findings of this research I argue that, while recognising the accounts do have an embodied component, such encounters do not neatly fit into a theory of embodied cognition because the theory overlooks the passive element in mystical experiences.
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Rachel Kevern (2026) studied this question.
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