Populism in power and bailout conditionality: evidence from Greece

The article focuses on the policy record of the Syriza-Anel coalition that governed Greece from 2015 to 2019. The goal of the article is to contribute to the understanding of decision-making and policy choices of populists in power by focusing on the strategies, constraints, and opportunities available to populist governments under conditions of crisis and bailout conditionality. Using a process tracing methodology, the main finding of the article is that populist governments, even when forced to implement externally imposed policies that they oppose, maintain their populist character and ideology. The main lesson from the Greek experience is that populist governments can leverage the prioritization by the creditors of fiscal policy targets in order to stall reforms in other policy areas and pursue illiberal political reforms. This finding challenges the ‘moderation’ hypothesis concerning the ideological effect of governmental experience on populist parties.