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Opposition victory is a plausible path to democratic renewal in electoral autocracies, but opposition status alone does not guarantee democratic commitment. This article develops the concept of discursive democratic potential: an actor-level, discourse-based framework for examining how opposition challengers publicly articulate democratic restoration, plural political membership and norm-bound competition while still outside government. Treating discourse as diagnostic evidence rather than a sincerity test, the framework evaluates political goals, pluralism and norm consistency, with particular emphasis on the target and direction of confrontation. Empirically, the article compares Péter Magyar and the Respect and Freedom Party (TISZA) in 2024–2025 with Viktor Orbán’s challenger-period discourse before Hungary’s 2010 regime transformation. The analysis draws on a 518,216-word corpus coded through keyword-assisted retrieval, semantic validation, author adjudication and blind human validation. Democratic and mostly democratic blocks dominate both corpora, risk cases are rare and no passage reaches the autocratic-prone threshold. Yet risk structures differ: Orbán’s warning signs are more structural and hegemonic-majoritarian, while TISZA/Magyar risk is more explicit, vertical and accountability-oriented. The article shows why democratic vocabulary, civility and opposition status are, on their own, insufficient guides to democratic potential under autocratic pressure.
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István Benedek (2026) studied this question.
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