Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Theoretical analysis reveals how epistemic norms emerge from scaffolded cognitive activity rather than prior conceptual knowledge, indicating that agency drives rule-governed rational thought.
This paper presents an action-centered approach to epistemic normativity. It argues that sensitivity to epistemic norms does not depend on prior knowledge of concepts such as truth, justification, or evidential adequacy. Furthermore, sensitivity to epistemic norms cannot be reduced to the reliable functioning of mechanisms that merely predict likely success. Rather, epistemic sensitivity emerges through the regulation of externally scaffolded, concept-oriented cognitive activity. According to the defended view, explicit epistemic concepts are not a precondition of such sensitivity, but rather one of its later products. Contrary to purely reliabilist views, the paper contends that epistemic regulation encompasses more than statistical success; it hinges on consistent reasoning principles that constitute the requirements of correct reasoning. Drawing on research in metacognitive psychology, developmental studies, and information theory, the argument is made that epistemic norms become salient when individuals learn to recognize invariants in computationally distinct forms of reasoning that are informationally equivalent. In this dynamic model of epistemic agency, normative awareness emerges from socially regulated, concept-oriented practices.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Joëlle Proust (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: