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Historical analysis uncovers the rise and decline of Shia foreign fighters in the 1980s, indicating that state-level ideological factionalism dictates militant mobilization.
The scholarship on Muslim foreign fighters has expanded, but it still overlooks the case of Shia transnational war volunteers. Shia foreign fighters emerged in the 1970s and early 80s, became less prominent through the 80s, and resurfaced during the 2011 Syrian civil war. What explains the rise and decline of Shia transnational war volunteers in the 1980s? I argue that their mobilization and demobilization resulted from ideological factionalism in the heart of their state sponsor, Iran, itself triggered by the rise and demise of a militant, internationalist faction in Tehran which had strong ties to these transnational war volunteers. This article makes three contributions. Empirically, it provides the first origins story of Shia foreign fighters. Conceptually, it illuminates state-backed (as opposed to private) foreign fighting. Theoretically, it provides an institutional account of ideology's effect on armed conflict, highlighting the effects of ideological factionalism on militant mobilization.
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Raphael Lefevre (2026) studied this question.
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