The influential first offer: How to advance a negotiation classic by integrating features, mechanisms, and outcomes

This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.

Six decades of research and hundreds of effects have identified robust first-offer advantages and disadvantages. Too assertive an offer can alienate the opposing negotiator, elevate the impasse risk, as well as impair the relationship and outcome satisfaction. In contrast, first offers can also beneficially anchor negotiation outcomes in the first mover's favor. This advantage is particularly strong when first movers effectively apply the first offer's moderating features precision, framing, ranges, and rationales. Despite more than six decades of research, existing studies on first-offer effects tend to isolate specific mechanisms or outcomes, thereby capturing a comparably narrow slice of the underlying complexity. We argue that future research can (and should) advance this field by further integrating first-offer features, psychological mechanisms, and separate measures of negotiation outcomes.