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Routing in vehicular network is a challenging task due to the characteristic of intermittent connectivity, especially when nodes behave selfishly in the real world. Previous works usually assume that all nodes in the network are willing to forward packets for others, which is impractical in real world. Selfish behaviors of nodes would degrade network performance greatly. In this paper, we propose SCR, a social contribution-based routing protocol, for selfish vehicular network. When making forwarding decision, SCR considers both the delivery probability to the destination and the social contributions of the relay node. The delivery probability is determined by the social relations among nodes and social contribution is used as the incentive to stimulate selfish nodes to be more cooperative, which consists of reciprocal contribution and community contribution. The node with higher delivery probability and lower social contributions is the preferred candidate for the next hop. Simulation results show that SCR achieves better performance than other social routing protocols with the incentive scheme.
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Gong et al. (2014) studied this question.
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