What does this research mean for the field?

Non-human primates possess representations of other minds but rely on them significantly less frequently than humans do, suggesting that species differences in social cognition are characterized by graded reliance rather than absolute presence or absence. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.NOVEL_FINDING. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.ESTABLISHES_NEW_DIRECTION.

What question did this study set out to answer?

To resolve debates over non-human primate Theory of Mind by evaluating whether primates represent others' mental states and how frequently they deploy those representations.

September 14, 2026CognitionOpen Access

What primates know about other minds and how often they use it: A computational approach to comparative theory of mind

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Authors

MBMarlene Berke DHDaniel J. Horschler ARAmanda Royka

Discussion

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Overview

Computational modeling reveals non-human primates possess mental representations but deploy them far less than humans, suggesting comparative social cognition varies by cognitive reliance.

Key Points

To resolve debates over non-human primate Theory of Mind by evaluating whether primates represent others' mental states and how frequently they deploy those representations.
Developed a computational theory-testing framework that integrates hypothesized social representations with an explicit parameter quantifying reliance frequency.
Fit candidate computational models against behavioral data across five classic visual perspective-taking paradigms evaluating seeing and knowing in non-human primates compared to a human baseline.
Models lacking representations of other minds failed to reproduce the observed qualitative patterns of success and failure across the perspective-taking paradigms.
Non-human primate performance required representations of other minds, but all best-fitting models exhibited significantly lower reliance on these representations compared to human baselines.

Cite This Study

Berke et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6aa7b3bf0926e14a848b2f1d https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106698

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September 14, 2026CognitionOpen Access

What primates know about other minds and how often they use it: A computational approach to comparative theory of mind

View Full Paper

Ask AI

Bookmark

Authors

MBMarlene Berke DHDaniel J. Horschler ARAmanda Royka

Discussion

Member takes

Overview

Computational modeling reveals non-human primates possess mental representations but deploy them far less than humans, suggesting comparative social cognition varies by cognitive reliance.

Key Points

To resolve debates over non-human primate Theory of Mind by evaluating whether primates represent others' mental states and how frequently they deploy those representations.
Developed a computational theory-testing framework that integrates hypothesized social representations with an explicit parameter quantifying reliance frequency.
Fit candidate computational models against behavioral data across five classic visual perspective-taking paradigms evaluating seeing and knowing in non-human primates compared to a human baseline.
Models lacking representations of other minds failed to reproduce the observed qualitative patterns of success and failure across the perspective-taking paradigms.
Non-human primate performance required representations of other minds, but all best-fitting models exhibited significantly lower reliance on these representations compared to human baselines.

Cite This Study

Berke et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6aa7b3bf0926e14a848b2f1d https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106698

View Full Paper

Ask AI

Bookmark