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Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s recent joint statement indicated that Indonesia supported China’s maximalist position on Taiwan and Xi’s global initiatives, and that it was a broadly cooperative maritime neighbour. It was largely silent on US–China strategic competition and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The joint statement was a diplomatic victory for China, attributable to the Indonesian president’s belief in non-alignment, aversion to conflict, and prioritisation of domestic stability and economic benefits, as well as a lethargic Foreign Ministry dominated by Foreign Minister Sugiono, a long-time Prabowo loyalist. If Indonesia is sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China, now its largest trading partner, Prabowo’s defence and security agenda could also pull the country towards the West given that Indonesia relies heavily on the United States and Europe for its defence capabilities. Should US–China strategic competition intensify, as appears likely, such strategic compartmentalisation could become increasingly untenable.
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Evan A. Laksmana (2025) studied this question.
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