Research Question/Issue This study examines the relationship between classified boards and firms' environmental and social (E&S) performance. We ask whether the insulation associated with classified boards is related to firms' sustainability outcomes and whether external monitoring and investor horizon condition this relationship. Research Findings/Insights Using 14,066 US firm‐year observations from 2002 to 2020, we find that firms with classified boards exhibit significantly lower overall E&S performance. This negative association is concentrated in the environmental dimension. The adverse association with E&S performance is weaker among firms subject to stronger institutional monitoring and, in particular, among firms with greater long‐term institutional ownership. We further find that classified boards are associated with a higher incidence of negative E&S events and greater disagreement across ESG rating providers. Finally, classified boards are negatively associated with firm value, and our path analysis is consistent with E&S performance and rating disagreement serving as channels linking board structure to valuation. Our results are robust to using instrumental variable estimation, and entropy balancing. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings are consistent with the managerial entrenchment view of classified boards. Although classified boards may provide stability and protection from short‐term market pressures, the evidence suggests that this insulation can be associated with weaker accountability and lower engagement in sustainability‐related activities. The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by showing that the implications of classified boards extend beyond conventional shareholder outcomes to stakeholder‐oriented, non‐financial outcomes. It also contributes to the ESG literature by identifying board structure as an important correlate of both corporate E&S performance and disagreement among ESG rating providers. Practitioner/Policy Implications The findings have implications for investors, corporate boards, and policymakers evaluating the costs and benefits of classified boards. Shareholders may wish to consider the potential E&S consequences of board classification, particularly in firms where external monitoring is weak. More broadly, the results suggest that institutional monitoring and long‐term ownership can play an important role in mitigating the adverse E&S associations of classified boards. For policymakers, the evidence is relevant to debates over board declassification, director accountability, and the governance of corporate E&S activities.
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Haß et al. (2026) studied this question.
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