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Since 1995, more than 50 percent of the firms in the FTSE‐100 have granted rewards to their senior executives, the payoffs of which are contingent on the firm’s stock return relative to a bench mark return over a given period (hereafter, relative performance incentives). This paper investigates and derives closed‐form solutions for a class of relative performance incentives that have a positive payoff if, in addition to the traditional contingencies, the firm’s stock return is higher than the market return times a threshold. Results suggest that UK firms, in practice, when relative performance incentives (RPI’s) substitute absolute performance incentives (API’s) tend to (i) decrease the cost of their compensation packages; (ii) undertake more risky capital‐investment projects; and (iii) avoid providing so high‐powered incentives to increase shareholder wealth.
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António Câmara (2001) studied this question.
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