Conceptual analysis clarifies the wrong kind of reasons objection in value theory, suggesting criteria to distinguish genuine value from extrinsic motives.
According to T.M. Scanlon's buck‐passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The ‘wrong kind of reasons’ objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such reasons are of the wrong kind. This is what I set out to do, after illustrating the objection more thoroughly.
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Jonas Olson (2004) studied this question.
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