Philosophical analysis challenges the attribution of reason-providing goodness to G. E. Moore, indicating that rejecting this view does not automatically favor buck-passing value theories.
Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.
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Jonas Olson (2006) studied this question.
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