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Japan's first comprehensive AI legislation places "promotion" at its centre. The orientation itself is not unique, since the United Kingdom and Singapore have adopted comparable postures. What distinguishes Japan is the social conditions under which it made this choice. The urgency of Japan's governance problem comes from the economic and social cost of AI going unused. Governance is being pursued in a society where adoption is low, public trust is likewise low, and an ageing population coincides with ageing industrial IT systems. In the year since the Act was passed in 2025, personal use and firm-level trial have both risen sharply, while deployment within firms remains sharply stratified by firm size. The government has updated its Basic Plan accordingly, placing its emphasis on organisational change. Promotional instruments reduce the cost of trying. They do not supply the capital, personnel and managerial authority that organisational integration requires. Japan pairs state coordination with voluntary compliance rather than binding regulation, its market does not confer the leverage that EU-style rule export depends on, and its industrial structure does not support the self-organising innovation on which the American model rests. This governance model has been shaped by Japan's particular policy problem and policy environment, and the difficulties it faces differ accordingly.
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Wang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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