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Patron-client relations in small-scale fisheries provide capital, market access, and social protection, yet also reinforce unequal control over labour, credit, and fish sales. This study examines this tension at Pulau Baai Fishing Port, Bengkulu, Indonesia, through a qualitative case study based on interviews with 13 crew members, captains, vessel owners, and tengkulak. The findings reveal a layered dependency chain. Bonding social capital strengthens solidarity among crews, while bridging and linking capital remain concentrated among vessel owners and tengkulak. Flexible credit, emergency support, and transparent weighing create moral legitimacy, turning gratitude and loyalty into obligations that sustain exclusive sales, weak price negotiation, and limited exit. The study explains how material assistance becomes moral capital and stabilises hierarchy across actor levels. Policy should preserve existing risk-sharing functions while separating them from exclusive purchasing and opaque pricing through diverse market channels, transparent transactions, accessible working capital, and meaningful fisher participation in program design.
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Gani et al. (2026) studied this question.
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