Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
While sitting in the office on a late Friday afternoon, catching up on the week’s tasks, an email with the subject ‘Provider Productivity Scorecard’ popped up in an already-inundated inbox. Curious to learn its contents, the clinic notes were ‘pended’ to interpret the visually-appealing graphs. Though familiar with Kaplan–Meier curves, forest plots, and scatter diagrams through several years of working at academic medical centres, it was still puzzling to see the bar graphs comparing clinical productivity with peers at the same institution, and from across the nation. Should providers’ work at academic medical centres be judged by just one metric, the relative value unit (RVU)? The RVU is a measurement used in the Resource Based Relative Value Scale that forms the basis of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) fee schedule. The RVU is used to determine the monetary value for services using a formula accounting for (i) work, (ii) practice expenses, and (iii) malpractice costs. Geographic considerations and an annually updated conversion factor determined by CMS are applied to these variables to calculate a dollar amount per RVU.1 The RVU was developed to account for all clinical services dispensed by providers and provide greater consistency when comparing services. At the time it was developed, the RVU was a better alternative than the prevailing ‘usual, customary, and reasonable’ model of reimbursement, where rates were based on local community standards.2 While the RVU model is used to determine reimbursement from Medicare, private payers also base their payment rates from this schedule. Work RVUs (wRVUs) are now part of the daily lexicon for health care providers; every Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code has an wRVU assigned to it. This holds true across the spectrum of medical practices—academic, group, or private practice. The wRVU is widely used to determine part of provider compensation by having a potential pay linked to clinical productivity.3 Such a measure is perhaps intuitive for providers in private practices, as it encourages them to fill their schedules by seeing more patients and doing more procedures. For their counterparts in academic medicine, the wRVU model has certain advantages. It can make income more competitive for academic providers compared with those in community practices. As in community practices, it encourages providers to fill schedules and potentially provide access to more patients. In theory, compensation based on clinical productivity seems to be fair, a ‘reap what you sow’ system. It rewards providers for their efforts, which appears more just than systems based entirely on salary or equal shares. The downside of the ‘RVU culture’ is that it threatens the very mission of academic medicine—patient care, education, and research. Patient care is affected when there is incentive to supplant value with volume. This fosters the annihilation of a deliberate, stepwise approach to medical practice. For example, it is more lucrative for providers to perform a repeat coronary angiogram to form a differential diagnosis for chest pain in a patient with recent percutaneous revascularization, compared with obtaining a detailed history and physical examination. Similarly, this model is an incentive to ordering an echocardiogram for elucidating the aetiology of palpitations, despite its low diagnostic yield (compared with a physical exam and a 12-lead electrocardiogram). It also fails to account for various labour-intensive tasks that aren’t necessarily ‘monetizable’, but still essential for quality care, e.g. taking time to understand patient values and goals, conducting family meetings, completing administrative forms, and communicating with consultants, paramedical staff, and patient disposition agencies.4 Surveys of providers in practices using wRVUs report a perceived decrease in the quality of care, as well as time spent per patient for evaluation and management.5 Academic providers have also reported that the wRVU model fails to account for the time and effort required to care for patients with complex co-morbidities.6 List of non-clinical activities (primarily at academic medical centres) that do not translate into work relative value units (wRVUs) List of non-clinical activities (primarily at academic medical centres) that do not translate into work relative value units (wRVUs) It remains circumspect whether wRVUs can truly capture the spectrum of activities academic providers participate in on an everyday basis. Table 1 lists various activities in the daily schedules of providers working at academic medical centres that do not translate into wRVU generation. When clinical productivity is rewarded and non-clinical activities (involving patient care, education, and research) are not, the latter become less of a priority. There is evidence demonstrating that education and research are negatively impacted by wRVU-based compensation. A recent physician survey showed that productivity-based compensation reduces inclination to do non-clinical work, including research and teaching.5 An increased clinical workload can decrease the number of new research publications.7 In addition, compensation based on wRVUs may result in a decrease in the quality of training of residents and fellows.8 At many institutions, these non-clinical activities are not additionally compensated for, but nonetheless expected. While some places are developing methods to track and reward non-clinical activities that are sine qua non for the existence of an academic medical centre, the effort leaves much to be desired. Development of a compensation model that doesn’t discourage participation in education and research is crucial. It may be argued that these activities are intrinsic motivators for being in academics, and that the intangible benefits (privilege of being at the cutting edge of medical science, for example, or the perceived prestige of being at an academic medical centre) should be enough for providers to accept lower pay than what they may get elsewhere. However, this argument may be rendered invalid in the current environment where an increasing amount of hospital revenue comes from clinical care, translating into pressure to ‘produce’. This new reality of academic medicine can particularly affect providers in the early stages of their career. Financial pressures are a deterrent to minds teeming with research ideas, fresh out of postgraduate training. Dissatisfaction with the current model results in young providers becoming expeditiously disillusioned with academia. After implementation of productivity targets, providers have been found to be significantly less satisfied with practicing medicine.5 A survey of University of Colorado School of Medicine Faculty found that 42% of respondents were seriously considering leaving academics, citing reasons including teaching not being adequately rewarded, and a lack of a strong academic community.9 Burnout is also a significant issue in the current environment and has become a major focus of research. Its cause is certainly multifactorial, but potential determinants include increased patient volume in clinics, lack of time with individual patients, and lack of institutional support for careers.10–12 It’s been shown that providers who spend more time doing personally meaningful work and seeking career goals have lower rates of burnout.13 For those in academics, these goals are (usually) excellence in education and research. Restoring the mission of academic medicine requires reorganization of the existing compensation model. wRVUs are not the best estimator of procedure complexity or effort, and despite being annually updated, many codes aren’t accurately representative of technological advances, which have drastically reduced procedure times.4,14 Also, RVUs only capture one aspect of clinical care—volume. It is essential to have value-based measures (e.g. patient outcomes, rehospitalization rates, etc.) to ensure that increased productivity isn’t synonymous with decreased quality. Such measures can encourage the various non-clinical patient care activities listed in Table 1. Another approach is to have productivity incentives be based on a department or group measure, rather than focused solely on individuals. This should take some pressure off individuals to always be performing at higher levels. A method for rewarding non-clinical work must also be devised. Different methods to reward education and research activities vary from institution to institution, including various ‘research RVUs’ or ‘education RVUs’. For example, Mezrich and Nagy describe how ‘academic RVUs’ can be used to track non-clinical work including publications, research, teaching, as well as administrative and community service.15 Although systems are not yet universal, and challenges remain on how to develop a perfect incentive—including how to quantify providers’ time and effort, and financial conversion determinations—the benefits have been demonstrated. Incentives for research have been shown to increase research productivity.16 Moreover, increasing preceptor stipends to better compensate for lost time significantly improved preceptor retention, as found by a study conducted at Harvard Medical School.17 Preceptors noted stipends were not the strongest source of satisfaction or motivation, but ‘raising stipends beyond a mere token of thanks eases the burden of teaching in a busy practice such that, the intrinsic pleasure of teaching is given play’. This reinforces the idea that while money isn’t the main driver why providers work in academics, having non-clinical work be recognized and valued can tangibly increase the inclination to take part in it. Although initially perplexed by the productivity report, it was a humble reminder that it’s the reality of medicine today. Incentives when used correctly are invaluable. However, when only one aspect is the incentive (i.e. volume), other areas (i.e. value) can become diminished. A better compensation model would appropriately recognize clinical work (including clinical value and quality), education, and research. Provider compensation methods have already been shown to affect how we work. The prevailing compensation system needs to be re-evaluated to create a model that is more sustainable for the mission of academic medicine. Conflict of interest: A.K. is a consultant to Medtronic and Philips. All other authors declared no conflict of interest. References are available as supplementary material at European Heart Journal online. Cardio Pulse contact: Andros Tofield, Managing Editor. Email: docandros@bluewin.ch
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Luong et al. (2018) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: