Government-consumer dual perspective: how dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms and consumer preferences shape new energy vehicle manufacturers’ production decisions—an evolutionary game analysis

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Under the dual carbon goals, the new energy vehicles industry has entered a new phase of high-quality transformation. However, the industry still suffers from issues such as false advertising and substandard quality. Furthermore, the government’s continued reliance on traditional static reward and punishment policies has become inadequate for aligning with manufacturers’ decision-making characteristics, resulting in insufficient regulatory effectiveness. Therefore, to address these issues, this paper takes consumer preferences into account, employing evolutionary game theory to examine the impact of dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms on the production decisions of new energy vehicle manufacturers, which focuses on analyzing core issues such as the internal combination optimization of dynamic rewards and punishments, manufacturers’ technological iteration pace, and product differentiation strategies. The research found that consumer demand is the core driver behind new energy vehicle manufacturers’ production decisions, these manufacturers must strike a balance between technological innovation, cost control, and market responsiveness. Meanwhile, the optimal regulatory approach for government departments is a combination of “static rewards and dynamic punishments”, which can effectively address NEVs industry violations and disorder. In addition, the internal combinations of dynamic punishment mechanisms exhibit significant differences, with the “low unit penalty + high penalty multiplier” combination being the optimal one. Overall, this paper provides a reference for promoting the high-quality development of the new energy vehicle industry.