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Moral deference strikes many as problematic. Some explain this problem by pointing to understanding: accepting a moral proposition on the basis of testimony is problematic because it’s in tension with understanding that proposition, and understanding moral propositions is especially important. In this paper, I argue that there is a set of non-moral propositions that it is also especially important to understand, for many of the same reasons that defenders of The Understanding Explanation give to defend the claim that understanding moral propositions is especially important. These propositions are featured in cases at the center of the debate about moral encroachment.
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Anna Brinkerhoff (2026) studied this question.
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