This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.
This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give sufficient attention to moral encroachment on credences. Also, many accounts focus on moral features that fail to support standard analogies between pragmatic and moral encroachment. Throughout the paper, I discuss racial profiling as a case study, arguing that moral encroachment can help us identify one respect in which racial profiling is epistemically problematic.
Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Sarah Moss (2018) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: