Consociationalism as opportunity structure: Hezbollah and the institutionalization of competitive authoritarianism

Contemporary research on autocratization largely explains democratic erosion as the outcome of elected incumbents who gradually undermine constraints, competition, and civil liberties. This article advances a theory of hybrid-actor autocratization, showing how a hybrid armed party can generate competitive authoritarian advantages without monopolizing formal executive authority. We argue that consociational institutions can function as opportunity structures for autocratization by supplying leverage points that a coercively capable actor can exploit across arenas. The framework identifies three mutually reinforcing mechanisms through which Hezbollah converts Lebanon’s consociational arrangements into political advantage: coercive autonomy, partisan governance and electoral advantage, and obstruction of accountability. The actor converts coercive capacity, welfare provision, and alliance networks into uneven competition, selective enforcement, and reduced accountability while preserving an appearance of pluralism. The argument is developed through a within-case, mechanistic account of Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon’s post-war political order, triangulating four semi-structured expert interviews with secondary evidence. Findings show that Hezbollah’s coercive autonomy expands its bargaining power, its welfare and clientelist networks generate partisan dependency and electoral advantage, and its alliances and veto capacities obstruct accountability. The article contributes to autocratization theory by relocating attention from executives to hybrid actors.