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This paper offers a structural analysis of how criteria for recognizing liberation shift in later scholastic and institutional receptions of Madhyamaka philosophy. While Madhyamaka famously characterizes nirvāṇa as the pacification of conceptual proliferation (prapañca), this paper argues that continuity with early Buddhist soteriology weakens at the level of public criteria of recognition rather than at the level of diagnosis in principle. Early Nikāya-style presentations primarily recognize liberation through irreversible experiential cessation: the non-arising of craving, aversion, and afflictive reactivity. By contrast, later receptions of Madhyamaka often render liberation publicly legible through epistemic and discursive proxies, such as demonstrable non-reification, dialectical fluency, and mastery of emptiness discourse. Because the cessation of svabhāva-grasping is not directly inspectable, these proxies can function as substitutes for experiential verification. The paper develops three related claims: (1) cognitive conditions for suffering are not automatically usable public criteria for its cessation; (2) even without ontological reification, “ultimate truth” can function as an untranscendable evaluative framework, yielding a form of functional reification; and (3) shifts in soteriological criteria generate institutional selection effects that privilege interpretive authority over phenomenological transformation. The analysis is intentionally modest about Nāgārjuna’s intent and does not reject Madhyamaka as a liberative framework. Instead, it offers a reception- and structure-sensitive account of how soteriological criteria change as philosophical discourses are systematized, transmitted, and embedded in institutions that require publicly inspectable standards of evaluation. The paper concludes by asking whether recognition can be re-anchored in experiential cessation without abandoning Madhyamaka’s critical insights.
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Jiawei Chen (2026) studied this question.
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