The Representation Trap: How Minority Power Shapes Electoral Politics in India

Liberal democracy requires that minority groups be represented in politics. This article argues that minority representation can also generate headwinds for political inclusion by dividing the minority group and consolidating the dominant group. I study the combination of these processes, termed the representation trap, through a mixed-methods examination of Muslims in India. Analyses of election results and an original survey of Hindu and Muslim voters show that electing a Muslim representative divides Muslim votes across an increased share of coethnic candidates and consolidates Hindu votes for the majoritarian party in the subsequent election. Qualitative evidence and a vignette experiment trace these patterns to two mechanisms: sub-identity activation among Muslims and super-ordinate identity mobilization among Hindus. By showing how representation restructures elite and voter behavior within both minority and dominant groups, the article highlights the dynamic nature of ethnic politics and complicates the view of minorities as politically unified.