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Global advertising agencies now deploy AI systems that make millions of campaign decisions daily, yet their clients hold fundamentally different expectations about the acceptable level of algorithmic authority. A European financial services client under GDPR and a performance-oriented Southeast Asian brand illustrate this divergence, which reshapes how human-AI collaboration must be governed in practice. Drawing on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork across three globally oriented advertising agencies in Asia, comprising participant observation and semi-structured interviews with 30 practitioners, this paper develops evidence that AI governance is not standardized but relational: it is shaped by client-origin governance expectations as attributed by agency-side practitioners. We develop a three-dimensional framework covering who decides (delegation architecture), how much they are trusted (trust calibration), and who answers for outcomes (accountability navigation), and introduce client-origin governance expectations as the moderating construct explaining this variation across clients, one that capability-based and institutional accounts alone cannot address. The paper specifies a boundary condition in Human-AI Complementarity Theory and the Hybrid Intelligence Framework: neither fully accounts for the external relational conditions through which governance is constituted. All claims about client expectations reflect agency-side practitioner attributions, not verified client positions. Practical implications are developed for global agencies, platform developers, clients, and brand managers.
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Tiwari et al. (2026) studied this question.
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