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This note studies standard equity auctions with bidder moral hazard that is prevalent in reality. First, we characterize the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the first-price equity auction and identify the weakly dominant strategies for the second-price and English equity auctions, respectively. In equilibrium, the first-price equity auction induces a lower expected equity payment, compared with the other two formats. On revenue comparison, we find that the first-price equity auction yields higher revenue to the seller and the same expected revenue to each bidder, compared with the other two formats. Accordingly, the first-price equity auction Pareto dominates the second-price and English auctions.
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Gao et al. (2026) studied this question.
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