This article examines the authority of the Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial, KY) in realising a clean judiciary by analysing the gap between constitutional ideality and the practical realities of ethical oversight of judges in Indonesia. Normatively, Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution and Law Number 22 of 2004 as amended by Law Number 18 of 2011 provide a robust constitutional foundation for the KY to propose the appointment of Supreme Court justices and to safeguard and uphold the honour, dignity, and conduct of judges through the Code of Ethics and Judicial Conduct (KEPPH). This research adopts a normative legal method, employing statutory and conceptual approaches, and utilises qualitative analysis of primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials to assess the scope of the KY’s authority and the constraints upon its exercise. The findings demonstrate that, although the normative design of the KY reflects the principles of checks and balances and promotes judicial accountability, its implementation encounters significant juridical, institutional, and political impediments. Limitations imposed by Constitutional Court decisions, the merely recommendatory character of ethical sanctions, institutional tensions with the Supreme Court, resource constraints, and political resistance collectively weaken the effectiveness of ethical oversight. These conditions widen the gap between the constitutional aspiration of a clean judiciary and empirical judicial practice. Accordingly, strengthening the KY’s authority, harmonising inter-institutional relations, and ensuring consistent regulatory and political support are imperative to enable the KY to fulfil its constitutional mandate effectively in safeguarding judicial integrity and institutional legitimacy.
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Hasmaryadi et al. (2026) studied this question.
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