From Intersubjectivity to Transindividual: A Critique of the Phenomenology of Alter Ego in Light of the Teachings of Spinoza, Simondon, and Deleuze

The present study offers a critical revision of the phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity and simultaneously justifies an alternative theoretical optics centered around the concept of the transindividual. The author shows that Husserl's apprehension of the alter ego, which implicitly reproduces Leibniz's monadological logic, encounters fundamental aporetic difficulties. The "Other" in this model turns out to be either a derivative projection of the transcendental ego or requires a metaphysical guarantee such as "essential simultaneity," which, for Husserl, effectively substitutes the Divine guarantor of pre-established harmony in Leibniz. In contrast to this egological tradition, the article unfolds a coherent argument in favor of a relational ontology of the transindividual. This ontology emerges at the intersection of several intellectual lines: Spinoza's doctrine of modes, Gilbert Simondon's processual ontology, and Deleuze's metaphysics of the fold. Methodologically, the work moves from Spinoza's analysis of affects as transindividual relations to Simondon's distinction between the pre-individual field and individuation. The concluding link is Deleuze's fold, which allows for thinking about the transition between matter and soul, as well as interior and exterior, without reliance on a transcendental guarantor. The synthesis reveals the contradictions of phenomenological intersubjectivity and proposes the transindividual, where the "Other" is not the alter ego, but a jointly constitutive element of the environment of individuation. The encounter with the "Other" is an event of resonance in the pre-individual field, where singularities have not yet solidified into definitive forms. The relevance of the work is dictated by the profound crisis of classical models of the "Other" in contemporary philosophy and social theory. This crisis manifests itself in the aporias of intercultural communication and in the challenges of digital interaction with non-human agents, for example, artificial intelligence systems. The novelty of the article lies in the systematic comparison of three heterogeneous philosophical lines of Spinoza, Simondon, and Deleuze within a unified perspective. Unlike previous studies that typically focus on one of these authors, this work constructs a common ontological framework where the concept of the transindividual serves as a direct theoretical antithesis to Husserlian intersubjectivity. The Spinozist relational ontology of affects receives a metaphysical justification through Simondon's category of the pre-individual, while Deleuze offers a topological explication through the concept of the fold.