This essay asks whether bodily autonomy entails authority over the life of another human being during pregnancy. Working within Gaitan Topology, it distinguishes authority over oneself from authority over another center of being. The body is treated not as property at absolute disposal but as received, embodied confluence, while the unborn child is described as a distinct monad whose being is neither authored nor grounded by the mother. Pregnancy is therefore interpreted as a maximal asymmetric tangency: a relation of radical dependence without merger or ownership. The essay develops the concept of the “uncoverable office,” a relational position that no third party can presently occupy, and uses it to reconsider Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument. It argues that bare dependence does not itself generate obligation, while distinguishing metaphysical structure, moral anthropology, and the natural-law principle that supplies the normative claim. The result is a distinction between authority over another and responsibility for one’s own response toward another.
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Oscar Gaitan (2026) studied this question.
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