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Standard models of reproductive autonomy presuppose a singular and bounded subject. This paper challenges that assumption by analysing the limit case of dicephalus parapagus conjoined twins where two distinct persons share a single reproductive system. I argue that this physiological configuration creates an ontological indeterminacy that biological essentialism cannot resolve. Drawing on a previous constructivist framework of reproduction, I demonstrate that when gestation is a shared biological event but personhood is distinct, the designation of "mother" cannot be discovered in the tissue but must be acknowledged through intention. The analysis proceeds to examine the severe ethical conflict arising when one twin wishes to reproduce while the other does not. I contend that prioritizing the reproductive desire of one sister over the refusal of the other constitutes a violation of bodily integrity analogous to involuntary gestational surrogacy. Consequently, I argue that in shared bodies, the non-reproducing person must hold an absolute power of veto. This aligns with established bioethical precedents, such as those discussed by Robertson, where the right to avoid involuntary biological parenthood is often held to supersede a former partner's desire to gestate shared embryos. Finally, this paper posits that the principles derived from this extreme case offer a necessary heuristic for broader bioethical issues. The example of conjoined twins validates the distributed maternity of Reciprocal IVF in lesbian couples while simultaneously reinforcing the protections against coercive surrogacy. By deconstructing the most extreme form of shared biology, this paper offers an exploration of a case of fragmented maternity and its implications.
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Adrian Villalba (2026) studied this question.
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