The SIPRI Yearbook 2026 has assessed that India may have deployed 12 nuclear warheads aboard a nuclear ballistic missile submarine. This raises questions about whether India’s credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and recessed deterrence posture is sustainable in the face of emerging sea-based deterrence and technological developments, demanding a closer analysis of force readiness, command-and-control, and the viability of de-mated nuclear forces. Drawing upon India’s strategic doctrine of no first-use (NFU), force modernization, SIPRI assessments and developments in the regional strategic environment, this article examines whether recent occurrences signify a transformation in India’s nuclear doctrine or are merely an adaptation of its operational posture. It argues that there is little evidence of a departure from NFU or CMD. Rather, the operational requirements of maintaining a survivable second-strike capability, together with China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, and advances in conventional precision-strike technologies, are placing increasing strain on India’s recessed deterrence. The article concludes that current developments are more accurately characterized as postural adaptation than doctrinal transformation.
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Ashutosh Singh (2026) studied this question.
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