Moral Normativity and Moral Emotions: Rediscovering Rationality and Affectivity in Kantian Ethics

This article aims to reconsider the question of emotions in Kantian ethics, which predominantly argues for the rational framework of good will, duty and the categorical imperative. It argues for the reasonable role of emotions in Kant’s ethical framework on account of the primacy of respect for moral law and moral motivation, which can be regarded as emerging arguments to validate the role of emotions in moral life from a Kantian perspective. This article contains three sections. The first section reflects on the basic principles of morality in Kantian ethics, which highlights the purity of morals and the primacy of reason in morals, thereby posing an argument against emotions in this normative structure. The second section argues for the place of emotions in moral life as accommodated in Kantian analysis. The third section undertakes an analysis of the rationality of emotions and the respect for moral law, as well as moral motive, to argue for the need to cultivate emotions and the importance of upholding moral rightness in Kant’s ethical framework. Thus, this article undertakes an examination of Kantian ethics to seek the possibility of the relevance of emotions in moral life.